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Abstract—This paper presents a formal development process 
for safety-critical embedded Human-Machine Interface (HMI) 
systems. This formal approach is centered on the LIDL formal 
language and the S3 verification toolset. It is aimed at blurring 
the boundaries between modeling, design, verification and 
implementation for the development of HMI. From textual 
requirements to software, the development process integrates 
the following formal activities: modeling the behavioral aspect of 
user interfaces (UIs) using LIDL; translating LIDL to Lustre, 
with which we combine the functional library in Lustre; 
translating the Lustre design models into the HLL verification 
models; verifying formal properties expressed in HLL against 
the HLL model using the S3 toolset, and diagnosing design errors 
with the help of  counterexample scenarios and debug tools. This 
formal development process is illustrated on a simple use case - 
part of the display component of an alert management system 
used in a three-wheeled robot.  
Keywords—Human machine interface, formal methods, 
specification, verification, integration, LIDL, Lustre, HLL, S3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Designing and implementing Human Machine Interface 
(HMI) systems is difficult and time-consuming [1]. On the one 
hand, this situation is due to some major characteristics of HMI 
design, such as the fact that it is difficult to anticipate all 
potential interactions between system components (human 
operators, human-machine interfaces, device automation, and 
operational environment) [2]. On the other hand, the HMI 
development heavily depends on specific design principles, 
technologies and tools [3]. Formal methods are valuable 
approaches for specification, validation, and verification of 
software/hardware systems. Although progress has been made 
in the development of HMI using formal methods for years, 
research topics on the integration of formal languages, 
methods and tools to transcend the boundaries between 
modeling, design, verification and implementation are still 
active [4] [5]. The problem faced by formal verification is that 
of scalability due to the state space explosion. Nevertheless, 
formal methods are considered suitable for the development of 
safety-critical embedded HMI systems, because the additional 
development cost is acceptable with respect to the cost of a 
failure in such systems, and because the nature and complexity 
of these systems make formal methods more scalable. 
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This work presents a formal development process for 
safety-critical embedded HMI systems embracing formal 
activities of modeling, validation, verification, diagnosis and 
implementation. This development process formally 
guarantees that the implementation of a user interface complies 
with its specification.  
Our formal process is developed around the HMI modeling 
language LIDL (LIDL Interaction Description Language) [6]. 
LIDL provides means to create abstract UIs, WIMP and post-
WIMP UIs, and task modeling. The LIDL language features 
abstraction, a formal definition, composition capabilities, and 
a prototyping focused approach. These characteristics are 
compatible with both the development and the formal 
verification of safety critical embedded HMIs. We thus center 
on LIDL for the implementation of a complete formal 
development process for HMI software. The main 
contributions of this paper are twofold: (i) design and 
implementation of a LIDL-to-Lustre translator; (ii) definition 
and implementation of a formal development process for 
safety-critical HMI software using the verification toolset S31. 
We illustrate this approach on the case of an alert management 
system used in a three-wheeled robot.  
The paper is structured as follows: Sect. II discusses the 
related works; Sect. III gives an overview of the development 
process, the supporting formalisms (LIDL, Lustre, and HLL) 
and relevant tools; Sect. IV shows the use case: a part of the 
display component of an alert management system used in a 
three-wheeled robot; Sect. V, the main contributions of this 
paper, presents the principles and methods implemented by 
each activity of the development process, and illustrates their 
application on the use case; finally, Sect. VI gives some 
concluding remarks and proposals for future works. 
II. RELATED WORKS
The IVY workbench [7] is a tool for developing and 
verifying models of critical UIs, where the UI model is 
specified using Modal Action Logic (MAL) and the properties 
are expressed using Computation Tree Logic (CTL). 
Properties are verified against UI models using NuSMV model 
checker. This work does not currently provide means to 
generate the embedded code or analyze the code.  
The ADEPT toolset [8] defines interfaces based on the 
input–output behavior. Abstraction is introduced to model the 
high level design of HMI. By associating a JavaPathfinder 
1 S3 is maintained, developed and distributed by Systerel 
(http://www.systerel.fr/). 
(JPF) model checker [9] with the toolset, it offers the ability to 
evaluate visibility and reliability properties automatically in 
the early design phase.  
ICO [10] is a user interface description language based on 
Petri nets. It provides a tool for the specification, design, 
prototyping, and validation of interactive software. As its focus 
is on the formal description of interaction and human task 
behaviors, the framework still needs to develop more support 
in the aspect of formal validation and verification of the low 
level implementation.  
In [11], the authors proposed an approach to validate an 
implementation of HMI systems with respect to their informal 
requirements using the CADP toolbox. It describes a system 
using the formal language LNT and formalizes the expected 
properties using MCL. The compliance between the 
implementation and the formal model is partially guaranteed 
by (i) generating test cases; (ii) co-simulating the formal model 
and the implementation; or (iii) generating log files and 
checking whether the formal model can simulate the traces in 
the log. Due to the fact that this approach uses a very abstract 
model of the system, and not the detailed design, it cannot fully 
determine whether the system implements the requirements as 
expected.  
The work [12] develops an approach to verify properties in 
the djnn framework using XPath pattern matching. It is 
centered on the djnn language, a code-level language for 
implementing interactive software as hierarchies of interactive 
components. This approach is applied to a restricted set of 
properties reducable to structural properties in djnn, such as 
visibility (i.e., being on the left side of the hierarchy), 
reachability (i.e., existence of a transition to some state in the 
hierarchy), etc.  
The SCADE environment [13] embraces the following key 
elements: (i) SCADE Display, a graphical editor allowing to 
define the graphical aspects of a UI; (ii) SCADE Suite, for the 
formal specification of embedded, reactive, synchronous 
systems, and formal verification integration into the 
development environment; and (iii) KCG, a qualified code 
generator that guarantees the exhibition of same verified 
properties in the generated code.  
Among the above design and verification solutions, the 
IVY workbench [7], ADEPT toolsets [8] and ICO framework 
[10] are focused on the formal modeling and verification of 
abstract design models, but do not address the correctness of 
the software implementation. The approach based on CADP 
toolbox [11] handles the compliance between formal model 
and implementation by simulation. The djnn framework [12] 
can facilitate the rapid prototyping and the verification of some 
properties based on static analysis. As the djnn language is a 
low level programming language, the design might be closer 
to the final code compared to other design formalisms, but the 
verification of final code still needs to be investigated. Finally, 
even though the SCADE solution covers the complete design 
process down to the implementation, it does not provide the 
abstract constructs required to formalize the textual 
requirements during the initial design phases.  
Our work is thus aimed at handling the gaps of the above 
works using the LIDL modeling language and the S3 
verification toolset from three major aspects: (i) the lack of 
abstraction in the formal model; (ii) the lack of efficient formal 
verification methods; (iii) the obstacles between  different 
activities in a complete formal development process. 
III. OUR APPROACH
The architecture of the formal development process is 
depicted in Fig. 1. It translates textual requirements (A) to 
verified C code (E), through following phases: 
• (B) LIDL design phase: (b1) modeling the textual
requirements in LIDL, including the data type, interfaces,
interactions, and interactive behaviors, etc.; (b2) validating
the LIDL model with respect to the textual requirements
using the simulator for LIDL models.
• (C) Lustre design phase: (c1) translating the LIDL HMI and
widget models into the Lustre models; (c2) modeling
function library in Lustre with respect to the LIDL
specification; (c3) validating the integrated Lustre model
using luciole simulator.
• (D) HLL verification phase: (d1) translating Lustre to HLL
using Lustre-to-HLL translator; (d2) expressing properties
in HLL with respect to the textual requirements. (d3)
verifying properties using S3; (d4) diagnosing errors in case
of failure using counterexamples generated by S3.
• (E) Code verification phase: (e1) generating C code using
lus2c code generator; (e2) proving equivalence of the
verified HLL  model and the generated C code.
The languages LIDL, Lustre and HLL are involved in the 
process. The LIDL language is a synchronous language , and 
its semantics and definition are close to the ones of Lustre and 
HLL. Therefore, our proposal could be adapted to an industrial 
development process contered on industry grade technologies 
such as Esterel’s SCADE that is fundamentally related to 
Lustre synchronous approach.  
A. LIDL Modeling Language and Tools 
LIDL allows for the specification of interactive entities 
named interactors. An interactor is described in LIDL by its 
interface and its interaction. Interfaces describe control and 
data flows between interactors. Interactions describe the 
behavior of the interactor as the transformation performed 
between input and output flows. In LIDL, flows are 
synchronous, as in Lustre, for instance. LIDL allows the users 
to describe, in an abstract way, the interface; in a concrete way, 
the interactions associated to the interfaces. All details about 
LIDL can be found in this thesis [6].  
B. Lustre Modeling Language and the Toolset 
Lustre [14] is a formal, declarative, and synchronous 
dataflow language for programming reactive systems. It has 
been used as the core language of the industrial environment 
SCADE. The Lustre toolset provides various tools, e.g., 
simulator, code generator, and model checker. Our work relies 
on the luciole simulator and the lus2c code generator.  
C. HLL Modeling Language and the S3 Toolset 
 HLL, the modeling/verification language of the S3 toolset, 
is a synchronous dataflow language used to model a system, 
its environmental constraints as well as its properties. To give 
an overview of the language constructs, Fig. 2 shows the HLL  
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Fig. 1.  Architecture of Formal Development Process of HMI
model of a saturated counter (in Counter namespace) and its 
property on the range of output value (in Counter_Verif  
namespace). The counter reacts to the input command 
(modelled as an HLL enumeration): incrementation (INC), 
decrementation (DEC) or reset (RESET). The saturation range is 
defined by HLL constants. The behavior of the counter is 
initialized to zero and then periodically updated. The effect of 
INC and RESET are directly defined in the schedule, while the 
effect of DEC is defined as a function contract by using HLL 
constraints and an intermediate variable dec_input of the HLL 
block Fun_dec(). 
Namespaces:
Counter {
Types: enum {INC, DEC, RESET} Command;
Inputs: Command in;
Constants: int C_MIN := 0; int C_MAX := 100;
Declarations: int unsigned 32 cnt;
Outputs: cnt;
Declarations: int unsigned 32 dec_input;
Blocks: Fun_dec(int pre_v) -> (int v) {v:= dec_input;}
Constraints:
ALL f: Fun_dec (f.pre_v = C_MIN > d.v = C_MIN); 
ALL f: Fun_dec (f.pre_v > C_MIN > d.v = f.pre_v - 1);
Definitions:
cnt := 0, if in==RESET  then C_MIN
elif in==DEC  then Fun_dec(cnt)
elif in==INC    then
if cnt==C_MAX then C_MAX else cnt + 1
else cnt;
}
Counter_Verif {
Proof Obligations:
(Counter::cnt >= Counter::C_MIN)&(Counter::cnt <= Counter::C_MAX);
}  
Fig. 2. An Example of HLL Model 
Design models specified in SCADE/Lustre or code in 
C/Ada can be translated to HLL using the translators of S3. 
Then, the HLL model is automatically translated to a LLL 
model (Low Level Language) containing only boolean flows 
and restricted to three bitwise operators: negation, implication, 
and equivalence. Finally, the LLL model is provided to the 
proof engine of S3, S3-core, a SAT-based model checker 
which implements Bounded Model Checking (BMC) and k-
induction [15] techniques.  
S3 supports different activities of a software development 
process: property proof, equivalence proof, automatic test case 
generation, simulation, and provides necessary elements to 
comply with the software certification processes. It has been 
used for the formal verification of railway signaling systems 
by various industrial companies in this field. More details 
about HLL and S3 can be found in [16] [17]. 
IV. THE USE CASE 
The design and verification approach presented in this 
paper has been applied on the Alert Management System 
(AMS) used by TwIRTee, a small three-wheeled robot studied 
in the INGEQUIP project to experiment and evaluate methods 
and tools in the domain of HW/SW co-design [18] and formal 
verification [16] [17] [19] [20]. 
The AMS serves the same purpose as a Flight Warning 
System in an aircraft: it provides a supervision operator (the 
supervisor) with information about the state of the system, and 
more specifically about the occurrence of conditions that 
require immediate corrective actions, or alerts. An alert is said 
to be active when some specific condition is observed on the 
monitored system. “Left wheel is blocked” or “Battery is low” 
are typical examples of alerts. An alert signal is the means by 
which the supervisor is informed of the occurrence of the alert 
activation. The presentation of an alert signal to the supervisor 
shall transmit sufficient information to ensure an appropriate 
level of situation awareness. This requirement impacts the 
amount of information presented at once to the supervisor, the 
duration of the presentation, the order according to which 
alerts are presented, etc.  Alert conditions are computed from 
data collected from the various parts of the system. A 
dedicated component, coded in Lustre, computes the 
activation condition from those data. 
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Fig. 3. The Alert Display Panel 
Active alerts are ordered according to multiple criteria: 
criticality of the alert, time of occurrence of the alert, state of 
the alert, etc. The result is a totally ordered set of alerts. In 
practice, active alerts are presented in slots, i.e., a small display 
area containing a brief description of the alert (see  to  on 
Fig. 3). As the room on the display is limited, only part of the 
alert list, a “window”, can be displayed at once. Therefore, the 
supervisor is provided with interaction means to navigate in 
the list of active alerts (see). Note that the last activated alert 
is always displayed in a dedicated area (see ). Additionally, 
another set of interaction means (see  and ) is provided to 
change the state of a specific alert — the target alert (see ) 
— from active to acknowledged or cleared. Acknowledging 
the alert changes the way it is displayed: a large slot (2 lines, 
see ) is allocated to a non- acknowledged alert; a small slot 
(1 line, see ) is allocated to an acknowledged alert. Clearing 
an alert simply removes the corresponding slot from the slots 
list. The slot of the target alert is signalled by a dark border.  
The target alert and the target slot can be changed 
independently using dedicated interaction means, however (i) 
the target alert shall always be displayed on the target slot, and 
(ii) the displayed slots shall always display alerts in the order 
in which they appear in the list of active alerts. 
Let’s consider that alert ܽ and slot s are selected. Then if 
the user moves the alert selection cursor “up”, the display will 
basically scroll down so that the alert location ܽ − 1  is 
displayed on slot ݏ . Conversely, if the user moves the slot 
selection cursor “up”, then slot ݏ − 1 becomes selected, and it 
shows alert	ܽ . In some conditions, the two movements are 
correlated. Thus, if alert a  and topmost slot ( ݏ = 0)  are 
selected, then moving the slot selection cursor up will actually 
move the alert selection cursor down, i.e., alert ܽ − 1  is 
displayed on slot 0.  
Even such a simple function raises non trivial verification 
issues, in particular as alerts can be activated or deactivated at 
any time. Some properties to be verified are introduced in the 
part concerning verification. 
V. FORMAL ACTIVITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
This chapter details our contributions about the formal 
activities in the different phases (B, C, D, and E in Fig. 1) of 
the development process. 
A. From Textual Requirements to LIDL Specification  
The structure of AMS interfaces can be abstracted 
manually from the textual requirements. In particular these 
requirements refer to types of data that can be abstracted and 
represented as: 
data AlertId is Number 
data Date is Number 
data Category is Number 
data Move is Number 
data Alert is 
{ 
 Id : AlertId, 
 activated : Boolean, 
 staticPrio : Number, 
 acked : Boolean, 
 timestamp : Date, 
 category : Number, 
 dynamPrio : Number 
}  data AlertText is Text 
The interfaces of the alert management system include the 
interface with the rover system: 
interface System is 
{ 
 actAlertId  : Number in, 
 actTimeStamp  : Date in, 
 Alerts            : Alert[8] in, 
 ackedAlertId  : Number out 
} 
This interface receives a permanent flow of Alerts (8 
Alerts). These alerts can be activated and the actAlertId flow 
gives the number of the activated alert and alertTimeStamp 
gives the Date at which the alert was activated. An alert can be 
acknowledged by the user and in that case this information is 
returned by using the flow ackAlertid. 
Similarly the interface with the user that monitors the 
rovers can be built in the following way: 
interface User is 
{ 
 ackAlertId  : Number in, 
 alertMove    : Move in, 
 slotMove     : Move in, 
 slotdisplayed    : Boolean[8] out, 
 alertSlot        : AlertText[8] out 
} 
This interface expresses that the text of alerts are displayed 
by means of a set of 8 slots. A specific alert (the “selected” 
alert) is displayed on a specific slot (the “selected”’ slot). As 
explained in the previous section, the selected alert and the 
selected slot can be changed using dedicated cursors 
(alertMove, slotMove) that can be moved up and down. 
Finally, the user can also acknowledge the selected alert.  
The LIDL specification is given by the following 
interaction definition that depicts how to manage alerts 
between a rover system and a user by using the two interfaces 
previously defined. This interaction is the topmost one. The 
interaction (manage alerts between (roverSystem : 
System) and (controlUser : User)) realizes concurrently 
all the interactions that are involved in its definition. The first 
five interactions describe the whole behavior that is embedded 
in the global interaction. Each of them is also defined in LIDL 
and is a part of the whole formal specification.  The two last 
ones describe how flows are related to the two interfaces 
System and User. It can be seen that the alertSlot definition of 
the User interface is associated with a flow that is an AlertText 
out and that is produced by the interaction text of alert number 
(alertNumber : AlertId in). This interaction gives the text 
that corresponds to an alert id.   
interaction (manage alerts between (roverSystem : System) and    
                     (controlUser : User)) : Activation in is 
(all 
     (sort alerts (alerts) by priority on activation of  
        (activatedAlertId) at (activationTime) or acknowledge of     
         (acknowledgedId) giving (SortedAlerts)) 
 
     ((SelectedAlertId) is the alert id of the alert selected by the user  
       when moving by (alertSelectionMove) in (SortedAlerts)) 
 
     (A move (slotSelMove) on slot selector selects a new slot for  
      alert (SelectedAlertId) in (SortedAlerts) by designating which  
      slot is activated in (SlotsActivated)) 
 
     (display the selected alert (selectedAlertId) in  the selected slot  
      given as activated in (SlotsActivated) and give the alert id of  
      the alert newly inserted in each slot (alertIdSlots)) 
 
(display the slots (displayedSlots) with alert texts corresponding  
      to alert identifiers (alertIdSlots)) 
    ((roverSystem) = ({actAlertId    : (activatedAlertId), 
                  actTimeStamp  : (activationTime), 
                  Alerts  : (alerts), 
                  ackedAlertId   : (acknowledgedId)})) 
 
   ((controlUser = ({ackAlertId  : (acknowledgedId), 
               alertMove  : (alertSelectionMove), 
               slotMove   : (slotSelMove), 
               slotdisplayed : (displayedSlots) 
               alertSlot  : (text of alert number (alertIdSlots)) 
) 
Clearly, the LIDL syntax allows writing a specification 
that is (i) very close to natural language, (ii) fairly easy to 
understand, and (iii) formal. The formal aspect of the language 
resides in the definition of flows by means of very elementary 
and basic constructions of the language. The resulting (formal) 
model of the interactive system shall now be verified before 
being translated into some executable software. Toward these 
goals, we first translate the LIDL model into Lustre. In this 
way, we leverage the existing means provided by the Lustre 
toolchain.  
B. Model Translation from LIDL to Lustre  
The LIDL to Lustre translation tool relies on a pre-
processing of LIDL specification to inline the interface and 
data definitions and to keep only interactions. An external 
static Lustre library provides a translation for each LIDL data 
type and each LIDL construct2. The translation strategy is then 
(i) to type each data flow; (ii) to map each LIDL construct 
instance to its Lustre translation; and (iii) to provide necessary 
code and variables to make the mapping between flows linking 
the native interactions. The implementation of our LIDL to 
Lustre translator is based on the original work conducted 
during the design of the language [13]. The overall architecture 
of the tool has been kept as the original with modifications on 
the workflow to add the missing translation phases (typing, 
variables generation).  
In this setting, the (Button triggers (triggeredSignal: 
Activation out)): Button interaction is first inlined by the 
translator to replace the Button interface with its definition: 
click: Activation in. The output of the translator is then:  
-- Interaction Buttontriggers$ [1:13|1:91] 
node Button_triggers__triggeredSignal_Activation_out( 
    theInterface_click: Activation) 
returns (theArgs_triggeredSignal: Activation) 
let 
   -- Native [2:1|2:28] 
    theArgs_triggeredSignal = assign_Activation(theInterface_click, 
        theInterface_click); 
tel 
As we can see, the definition of the interaction is translated 
as a Lustre node. The arguments and interface atomic flows 
with in direction are used as inputs of the node and the ones 
with out direction are used as outputs of the node. We note that 
the Activation LIDL type is translated as the bool Lustre type. 
As each operator of the language is translated using the Lustre 
                                                           
2 At the time of writing, a few constructs are not yet handled by the translator. 
The development is ongoing. 
library, the assignment (() = ()) operator is translated as a call 
to the assign_Activation node statically defined as:  
node assign_Activation(activation: bool; in: bool) 
returns (out: bool) 
let 
    out = if (activation) then in else false; 
tel 
Our translator also provides traceability links between the 
input LIDL specification constructs location (line and 
columns) and the output Lustre code (with a comment for each 
Lustre construct/equation). An example can be found in the 
generated Lustre code for the Button triggers interaction. Each 
generated line has an additional traceability comment in a 
preceding line. The generated code is human-readable but 
some work is to be done as links between operations is done 
through variables and equations order to not necessarily reflect 
the execution order.  
After this translation phase, the initial LIDL model is 
expressed using Lustre code. However, as LIDL is not a 
programming language, a LIDL model usually refers to some 
low level interactions directly coded in Lustre and provided as 
a reusable library. This approach is similar to what is done 
with SCADE or Simulink where low-level, reusable or 
performance-critical operators are directly coded in C.   
C. Library Design in Lustre: The Slot Management 
Three important design choices determine the design of the 
alert slot management.  
First, we chose a synchronous implementation in order to 
(i) comply with the execution semantics of LIDL and (ii) to 
facilitate the verification with S3. The design is expressed in 
Lustre and transcoded in C using the lus2c tool. Furthermore, 
the state of the alert panel is completely updated in one 
execution cycle (i.e., the update is not decomposed into a 
succession of cycles).  
Second, we have chosen a design where the slots are 
statically defined, allocated, and positioned on the panel. In 
order to account for all possible ordering of acknowledged (1-
line) and non-acknowledged (2-line) slots, we create three sets 
of slots (see Fig. 4). One set contains the large slots vertically 
aligned with the panel borders (); the next set contains the 
small slots vertically aligned with the panel borders (), and 
the last set contains the large slots vertically offset by the 
height of a small slot (). Using an appropriate combination 
of slots from these 3 sets, any list of slots can be displayed. An 
example is given on the right-hand side of  Fig. 4. It is worth 
noting that this is not the only possible design solution. For 
instance, another solution could use one single set of slots and 
could use values of positions and heights to setup the slot 
panel.  
Finally, the slots to be displayed (from the three sets) are 
selected and their attributes, color and message, are set. Again, 
this operation is done synchronously by propagating an 
activation signal from slot to slot, starting from the target slot. 
The activation signal propagate up and down according to the 
state of the alerts (acknowledged or not), so as to avoid the 
situation where slots would overlap. An example is given on 
Fig. 4, here, the activation signals are propagated upwards and 
downwards from the slot allocated to alert 3. 
 
Fig. 4.  Slot sets 
The functional architecture of the slot management system 
is depicted in Fig. 5. First, the list of all alerts given in input 
( , active alerts are represented in yellow) is sorted according 
to a total ordering function taking into account the category of 
the alert (warning, caution, advisory), its time of activation, its 
acknowledgment state, etc. Sorting is achieved in a 
synchronous manner using a bitonic sorting network. Then, the 
target alert is selected according to the state of the “target alert 
movement” buttons (up/down/no movement). This functional 
block is implemented in a synchronous manner: the priority of 
the target alert for the previous cycle is propagated “down the 
list” to find out the new selected alert.  
 
Fig. 5. Slot management 
D. Property Verification and Error Diagnostics using S3 
The formal verification in our development process 
addresses both HMI and system properties. The works [4] [5] 
identified four categories of HMI properties for the UIs: (1) 
reachability, (2) visibility, (3) task related property, and (4) 
reliability. In this part, we first show how these properties are 
formalized in HLL; then present the verification process using 
S3 and explain the diagnosis of design errors and missing pre-
conditions; at last describe the contract-based verification 
approach.  
1) Formal Property Expression in HLL 
Reachability properties make assertions about the ability 
of the interface to eventually reach a particular state. The HLL 
expression of the generic reachability properties is P →
SOME	s: States	ሺQ) , where P is a pre-condition and Q is 
eventually reachable prediction. 
Visibility properties assert that visual feedback will 
eventually result from an action. An example of AMS 
requirements (REQ-16) and its HLL expression are given. 
REQ-16: Only active alerts shall be displayed. 
PROP-16:  
ۯۺۺ	s: slots	൫s. id	! = −1 → 	ۯۺۺ	i: ሾ0, 7ሿሺaሾiሿ. id = s. id → aሾiሿ. act)൯ 
Task-related properties describe the human behaviors that 
the interface is expected to support. An example of AMS 
requirements (REQ-8-1)  and its HLL expression are given. 
REQ-8-1: If the user clicks the [target alert up] button and the priority of 
previous selected alert is greater than the priorities of any current alerts, 
then the target alert shall be at the top of the alert list(*). 
PROP-8-1:   
൫	aselmov = up		&		ۯۺۺ	i: ሾ0, 7ሿሺ	p > aሾiሿ. p	)൯ → idx = 0 
(*) Index of the returned alert shall be 0. 
Reliability properties describe desirable interface 
properties that support safe HMI. An example of AMS 
requirements (REQ-17) and its HLL expression are given.  
REQ-17: The target alert shall always be displayed in the target slot.  
PROP-17: 	
ALL	s: Slots, a: Alerts	 ቀ൫s. x = target୶	&s. y = target୷	&a. idx
= target୧୬ୢୣ୶൯ 	→ s. id = a. id) 
2) Property Verification Process using S3 
Fig. 6 presents the process of property verification using 
S3. This process starts from the Lustre model, which integrates 
the Lustre model translated from the LIDL model and those 
from the Lustre functional library. This Lustre model is 
translated to HLL, combined with HLL properties, and then 
expanded to LLL to be solved by S3-core. If a property is 
falsifiable, generated counterexamples can be simulated at 
HLL or Lustre level. The simulation activity helps diagnose 
the Lustre design model, the translated HLL model and the 
HLL property.  
Fig. 6. Property Verification Process using S3 
Usually, properties are classified as safety or liveness ones. 
The former declares what should not happen (or should always 
happen), while the latter declares what should eventually 
happen. The completeness of a safety property can be achieved 
with k-inductive proof based on strengthening inductive 
invariants (also referred to as lemmas). S3 provides automatic 
analysis tools to help the search of lemmas. In the safety-
critical embedded systems, the reachability properties are 
usually restricted to a bounded time, which allows us to handle 
the liveness property as the reachability one using the “lasso” 
approach [21].  
3) Diagnosis of Design Errors  
The error diagnosis is illustrated using an example from the 
function (alertssel) of target alert selection in AMS. We give 
the lustre model of this function in Fig. 7, where aselmov is the 
human input event, p is the priority of an alert, idx is the index 
of alert in the alert list. This function depends on another 
function alertsel. 
function alertssel ( aselmov : Move; a : Alert^8; p : int ) 
returns ( idx : int );
var
p0,   p1,    p2,    p3,    p4,    p5,    p6,    p7   : bool ;       
idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4, idx5, idx6 : int ;      
let        
p0, idx0 = alertsel (  0, aselmov, a[0], true,  p, -1 ) ;
p1, idx1 = alertsel (  1, aselmov, a[1], p0, p,   idx0 ) ;
… 
p7, idx = alertsel (  7, aselmov, a[7], p6, p,   idx6 );
tel  
Fig. 7.  Lustre Model of the Function of Target Alert Selection 
 We take an AMS requirement (REQ-8-1)as example 
(previously defined in Sect. V.D.1) to explain the diagnosis. 
This property does not hold. A counterexample is generated, 
shown hereafter, where the index of the returned alert (idx) is 
-1 (should be 0 according to the requirement). This 
counterexample scenario is simulated in both HLL and Lustre 
models. The error in the design (see Fig. 7) is found: the value 
of the last parameter in the first invocation of the function 
alertsel should not be -1. 
idx = −1
aselmov = up 
p = 6132 
a.p = [6006, 6005, 6004, 4089, 4025, 3967, 3960, 3579, 3318]  
4) Diagnosis of Missing Constraints 
Sometimes the violation of properties are due to the 
misunderstanding about some constraints of the function or the 
system. Consider the following AMS requirement.  
REQ For any couple of different alerts (a1, a2) such that ܽ1.݅݀ ≠ ܽ2.݅݀, their 
global priorities (gp1, gp2) shall be different.  
PROP:    Constraints:   a1.id  ≠ a2.id ; 
                Proof Obligations:   a1.gp ≠ a2.gp;  
The counterexample of this property is shown hereafter, 
where two alerts (a1 and a2) with different ids (a1.id = 5 and 
a2.id = 2) have same global priorities (p = 8). This counter-
example is caused by the fact that  a1 and a2 are given identical 
timestamps (ts = 0), which should be explicitly forbidden by 
using a constraint (a1.ts ≠ a2.ts ).  
a1  = {id: 5, act: t, p: 8, acked: t, ts: 0, cat: warning}
a2  = {id: 2, act: t, p: 8, acked: t, ts: 0, cat: warning}
gp1= 851968
gp2= 851968  
5) Contract-based Verification 
Design by Contract is widely applied to improve the 
reliability of software systems. A contract varies from a simple 
assertion such as the assertion macros in C and C++ to domain-
specific contract languages. Contract-based verification [22] 
[23] allows reasoning on component-based design using 
contracts, which makes the verification of complex 
hierarchically defined system more scalable.  
We experimented contract-based verification on a set of 
AMS properties to evaluate its efficiency. To explain the 
principle of contract, an example (REQ-8-1) is given. The pre-
condition of this property is that the list of alerts (a[8]) has been 
sorted, expressed as the HLL constraint. 
REQ-16: Only active alerts shall be displayed. 
Constraints: 		ALL	i	:	ሾ0,7ሿ, j	:	ሾ0,7ሿ	ሺi < 	j	 → 	aሾiሿ. gp	 > 	aሾjሿ. gp)	; 
                                                           
3  We do not consider the verification of properties related to the 
software/hardware integration which (currently) rely on testing. 
TABLE 1 provides the statistics of the verification time for 
a set of properties, with or without contracts. The experimental 
results show that the scalability of formal verification has been 
significantly improved for some properties. 
TABLE 1. STATISTICS OF CONTRACT-BASED VERIFICATION  
Property Without contract With contract 
REQ-13 2 sec 1 sec 
REQ-14 152 min 1 sec 
REQ-15 32 min 1 sec 
REQ-16 98 min 1 sec 
REQ-18-1 5 min 40 sec 
E. Code Verification using S3 
At this stage of the process, properties are verified on the 
Lustre model. The C code, either manually implemented or 
automatically generated from Lustre, needs to be formally 
verified to ensure that it conforms to the initial requirements, 
before being embedded in the execution platform 3 . This 
demonstration can be achieved in three different ways:  
• Properties are verified on the Lustre model and the 
preservation of these properties in the code is ensured by 
the qualified code generation tool. In that case, most  
verification activities at code level can be alleviated, but the 
code generator must be qualified, which may be costly.  
• Properties are verified in the final code. However, applying 
some formal verification techniques at the code level can 
be very difficult due to the lacking of abstraction.   
• Properties are verified on the Lustre model and an 
equivalence proof is conducted to ensure that the design 
model and the final code are equivalent. 
The code generator in our work is not qualified, and the 
cost of verifications on the final code is relatively high. 
According to the above analysis, the last solution is thus 
adopted.  
Proving the equivalence of two models (or one program 
and one model) requires that their pertinent observable 
behaviors are identical for any valid sequence of inputs. Our 
approach guarantees the correctness of the AMS code by 
proving equivalence between the HLL model and the 
generated C code. Fig. 8 presents the process of equivalence 
proof. On the one hand, the Lustre model is translated to an 
HLL model using Scade-translator. On the other hand, the C 
code (generated from the Lustre model by using lus2c 
generator) is translated into another HLL model using C-
translator. Both HLL models are then expanded to LLL 
models using diversified expanders. The equivalence model is 
constructed and proved using S3-core.  
Lustre Model
translate
C Code
HLL Model
Lustre
HLL Model
C Code
LLL Model
Lustre
LLL Model
C Code
generate
translate expand
expand
equivalence
proof using S3
 
Fig. 8.  Process of Equivalence Proof 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 
This paper proposes a formal verification process covering 
a significant part of the development process of a safety-
critical HMI, from textual specifications to the final code. This 
process is supported by a set of formal languages (LIDL, 
Lustre, and HLL) and their relevant tools, including a 
specifically developed LIDL-to-Lustre translator and the S3 
formal verification toolset. It has been applied to the 
development of the display component of an Alert 
Management System of a small robot. Additionally, a contract-
based verification technique to reduce the overall verification 
effort has been applied and evaluated. Experimental results 
show that the formal methods are indeed suitable for the 
development of safety-critical HMI software. 
Concerning the LIDL language, work is currently on-going 
in the framework of the FORMEDICIS project to complete 
and improve the language, including the provision of 
additional constructs to facilitate modeling, and means to 
express properties. The LIDL to Lustre tool should also be 
improved in terms of maturity and features, and the correctness 
of this translation should be addressed. On the verification 
side, results of property verification using S3 should be 
expressed at the level of the input model (expressed in LIDL) 
rather than at the HLL level. This high-level feedback would 
leverage the bidirectional traceability links generated by the 
LIDL to C translator.  
Another direction would be to skip the translation to Lustre 
for verification purposes. A possibility would be to translate 
LIDL design models directly to some verification language, 
such as HLL or SMT-Lib. Verification would be done using 
SAT/SMT solvers. Other verification techniques such as 
symbolic model checking or static analysis are expected to be 
integrated in the LIDL verification framework. In case of using 
SMT solvers, a qualified code generator from SMT-Lib to 
embedded code is needed. Another direction is to use the 
Event-B [24] correct by construction method. Once the final 
refinement of design is obtained, the verification of generated 
code is handled by tools such as the ones advocated in [19].  
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